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Abstract
In the framework of incomplete markets, due to the non-existence of
trade at some points in time, and using a partial equilibrium analysis,
we show how the bid-ask spread of an European derivative is generated.
We also ¯nd conditons for the existence of the spread. These conditions
concern the market structure of the maret-makers, which can be a
oligolopoly with price competition or a monopoly, as well as the risk-
aversion of the demand and supply of the market.
1 Introduction
Financial markets present equilibria characterized by bid-ask spreads, that
can only be explained by market imperfections. The literature has been
centered in two main imperfections, namely information asymmetries and
transaction costs. This papers aims to show that equilibrium bid-ask spreads
may be generated by market illiquidity, an alternative market imperfection,
even in the absence of information asymmetries and transaction costs.
Among the traditional assumptions on which derivatives' pricing is based,
markets are perfect and the underlying asset can be transacted at any point
in time. Under the absence of arbitrage opportunities the value of a deriva-
tive can be computed as the value of a portfolio on the underlying risky asset
and risk-free bonds that exactly replicates its payo®. Such portfolio can be
rebalanced in a self-¯nancing way until the maturity of the derivative, by
continuously transacting the underlying asset and the bonds. Under these
assumptions, the calculated value of the initial portfolio can be shown to
be the equilibrium price of the derivative and is unique. In this paper we
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assume that the underlying asset cannot be transacted at every point in
time and study the impact of this constraint on the equilibrium pricing of
options. The illiquidity implies that markets may become incomplete, in
the sense that perfect hedging of the derivative in all states of nature is no
longer possible. Hence, a unique price does not exist anymore, opening a
range for the possible characterization of the equilibrium bid-ask spread.
The existence of a bid-ask spread may therefore be related to the pric-
ing of derivatives in incomplete markets. The di®erent approaches in the
literature to characterize such problem are revisited below.
First, we consider the superreplicating bounds for European derivatives.
The nature of such bounds is well characterized in the context of incomplete
markets in the papers by El Karoui and Quenez (1991,1995), Edirisinghe,
Naik and Uppal (1993) and Karatzas and Kou (1996). A direct application
to the case of European option pricing when the market for the underlying
is dry can be found in Amaro de Matos and Ant~ao (2001). The super-
replication procedure relates to the minimization of the expected losses,
as considered by FÄollmer and Leukert (1999). Several works, also using
superreplication, but with di®erent criteria of pure arbitrage opportunity,
got narrower superreplication bounds1. In most cases the superreplication
bounds produce too broad bounds, and certainly not equilibrium values.
An alternative pricing criterion, is the utility indi®erence pricing, as intro-
duced by Hodges and Neuberger (1989). This criterion, despite having the
disadvantage of being utility dependent, has a meaningful economic inter-
pretation. However, as Davis, Panas and Zariphopoulou (1993) suggest,
this de¯nition does not allow the determination of equilibrium prices be-
cause the reservation write price is always higher than the reservation buy
price. Therefore, reservations prices de¯ne a range in which the trading of
the derivative must take place but they do not determine equilibrium prices.
Alternatively, and still in the framework of utility indi®erence pricing, we
may introduce the marginal price as the utility indi®erence price for an in-
¯nitesimal quantity. Marginal pricing have been used in several contexts by
Davis (1997), Karatzas and Kou (1996) and Kallsen (2002). The uniqueness
of the marginal price is proved by Karatzas and Kou (1996), for portfolio
constraints, and by Hugonnier, Kramkov and Schachermayer (2005) when
the number of states of Nature is larger than the number of assets. However,
this price is not yet an equilibrium price re°ecting only the willingness to
pay for a marginal (in¯nitesimal) amount.
An alternative is to price the derivatives as their expected discounted
payo®, according to one of the several risk-neutral probability measures.
Several criteria have been proposed for the selection of one particular mea-
sure. For instance, theminimal martingalemeasure by Follmer and Schweizer
1See the works of Bernardo and Ledoit (2000), Cochrane and Sa¶a-Requejo (2000) and
Bondarenko (2003).
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(1990), the variance optimal measure by Schweizer (1996) and the minimal
entropymeasure by Rouge and El Karoui (2000) and Frittelli (2000a),(2000b),
who also analyzed the connection between entropy measures and utility-
based prices when utilities are exponential. The dependence of the utility-
maximization price on the choice of the distance metric, can be found in
Henderson (2005) and Henderson et al (2003). Coherent risk measures were
studied by Artzner et al (1999), and convex risk measures by Follmer and
Schied (2002). Such measures were introduced to axiomatize measures of
risk and to generalize the properties of utility-indi®erence prices.
With the exception of the marginal price, all the methodologies proposed
above either establish a range of variation for the value of the derivative or
use an ad hoc criterion in order to get the price without any economic
insight. In this work we intend to characterize an equilibrium price for our
speci¯c incomplete market model. Equilibrium in a ¯nancial markets must
verify that all agents maximize their utilities and markets clear. Hence, the
determination of equilibrium considers both market-makers' and traders'
decisions. Using the maximization utility approach, a market demand and
market supply for the derivative is constructed. We then introduce the
market-makers, who set an ask and a bid price, ¯rst in a monopolistic and





Market- Maker(s)Ask Price Bid Price
Figure 1: The derivatives' market.
Although a large number of studies on microstructure model of securi-
ties markets have been published in the last years, most of the attention
has been devoted to stock markets, while only a few papers discuss the mi-
crostructure of derivative markets2. Moreover, in order to generate a market
and a bid-ask spread another imperfections were introduced. We can group
them as the inventory approach3 and the information based approach4. In
2There is much work on stock bid-ask spreads but the spread of derivatives have been
investigated by fewer researchers. Biais, Foucault and Salani¶e (1998) analyze three di®er-
ent market structures and the ways the associated restrictions lead to di®erences in prices,
bid-ask spreads, trades and risk-sharing. There are also a few empirical studies examine
bid-ask spreads in the derivatives markets, such as, George and Longsta® (1993), Chan,
Chung and Johnson (1995) and Etling and Miller, jr (2000).
3Among others, Stoll (1978) and Amihud andMendelson (1980) studied bid-ask spreads
ans stock inventory. More recently, Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993), Hasbrouck and
So¯anos (1993), Madhavan and Smidt (1993) and Manaster and Mann (1996) also found
some evidence on the realationship of bid-ask spreads to market-maker inventory costs.
4Some authors discussing the topic: Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), Admati and P°eiderer (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1994). More recently,
Morrison (2004), Bagnoli et al (2001) and Vayanos (2001).
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the former case transaction costs determine the bid-ask spread. The market-
maker(s) want(s) to be compensated by the cost of keeping inventory. In the
latter case the asymmetry of information leads to the existence of transac-
tions. When there is an order imbalance that moves the market-maker away
from his desired inventory position, he adjusts the bid-ask spread to attract
orders to move back to his optimal inventory position. On the other hand,
information asymmetry models assume that an adverse selection problem
exists because the market-maker is at an informational disadvantage to the
informed traders. In this case spreads must be kept wide enough to en-
sure that gains from trading with the uninformed agents exceed the losses
associated with trading with informed agents.
Our model assumes neither asymmetric nor optimal inventory strategies
and still explains the existence of an equilibrium bid-ask spread. It is related
to the failure of continuous hedging portfolio rebalancing hypothesis. We
assume, as in Longsta® (2001), that the underlying asset can not be trans-
acted at all points in time. In this paper we provide conditions for a bid-ask
spread to exist if the risk-neutral market-maker is a monopolist. However,
if there are more than one market-market, and if they compete in prices,
there will be no equilibrium if the market-makers are risk neutral.
Our work is organized as follows. In section 2 the demand and supply of
the market are derived. In subsection 2.4 some simulations are performed
for constant relative risk aversion and constant absolute risk aversion utility
functions. Section 3 states the problem of the market-maker(s), presenting
¯rst the monopoly case and then the oligopoly case. Finally, in section 4 we
conclude. Our main technical proofs are presented in the appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a discrete-time two-period economy, corresponding to dates t = 0;1
and 2: Due to liquidity constraints transactions are only possible at time
t = 0 and t = 2. At time t = 2 there are three possible states of Nature,
labelled by i = 1; 2; 3: In this economy there are three di®erent assets being
transacted. The ¯rst one is a risk free asset with unitary initial value, that
provides a certain total return of R per period; the second is a risky asset
(the stock) with initial value S0 and uncertain ¯nal values Si2; for i = 1;2;3:
In particular, we number the states in an order such that S12 > S22 > S32;
notice also that, in order to avoid arbitrage opportunities, we must have
S12 > R2S0 > S32; ¯nally, the third asset is a European derivative, written
on the stock, with expiration date T = 2: The possible payo®s at time
t = 2 are denoted by Gi2; for i = 1;2; 3; and depend only on the ¯nal state
of Nature. We also assume that the payo®s of each considered European
derivative are ordered according to the states' labels, in a monotonic way.
Every agent may build a portfolio composed of shares, risk free asset
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and derivatives. By assumption, each agent can in°uence neither the market
price of the stock, nor the market price of the derivative. Each representative
agent maximizes a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, EU (:) ; of
the wealth at time t = 2: The utility function U (:) is increasing and concave
in wealth. These properties imply that the marginal utility is positive, but
decreasing, in wealth.
In the following subsection we derive the individual and market demand
and supply. In section 2.4 the individual demand and supply for two di®erent
types of utility functions are presented.
2.1 Demand
Consider a representative agent that maximizes the expected value of wealth
at the terminal date, t = 2: The problem that he faces is to choose the
number of shares ¢0;d that he will hold, the amount B0;d invested in the
risk-free asset and how many units qd of the derivative he is going to buy, for

















¢0;dS0 +B0;d + qdPd · y (1)
¢0;dSi2 +R2B0;d+ qdGi2 ¸ 0 ; i = 1;2; 3 (2)
and
qd ¸ 0:
Proposition 1 Ignoring the positivity constraints of wealth at time 2, pre-
sented in equations (2), the optimum values ¢¤0;d and q
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Proof. As the utility function is increasing in wealth the constraint
presented in equation (1) is satis̄ ed in equality. Hence, the problem above
























¸ 0 ; i = 1; 2; 3
and
qd ¸ 0:









· 0, qd ¸ 0, @E[U(:)]@qd qd = 0
leading to equation (3). The maximum is guaranteed since the second order
conditions are satis¯ed. See appendix A for details.
In the next proposition, a necessary and su±cient condition to have a
negatively sloped individual demand is established.
Proposition 2 A necessary and su±cient condition for Ád (Pd) to be a de-



























































Proof. See appendix A for details.
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From the maximization problem above faced by a representative buyer of
the derivative, we obtain the optimal amount q = Ád (Pd) : If this function is
monotonic, i.e., if the condition of the above Proposition is satis¯ed, Ád (Pd)
may be inverted in order to obtain an individual market demand
Pd = Á¡1d (q) :
Assuming that there are n equal agents buying the derivative in this econ-
omy, the market demand (Qd) and the inverse market demand can be written
as






Consider a representative agent that maximizes the expected value of wealth
at the terminal date, t = 2: The problem that he faces is to choose the
number of shares ¢0;s that he will hold, the amount B0;s invested in the
risk-free asset and how many units qs of the derivative he is going to sell, for

















¢0;sS0 + B0;s ¡ qsPs · y (4)
¢0;sSi2 + R2B0;s ¡ qsGi2 ¸ 0 ; i = 1;2; 3 (5)
and
qs ¸ 0;
where ¢0;s; B0;s and qs denote, respectively, the number of shares bought/sold,
the amount invested in the risk free asset the number of derivatives sold.
Proposition 3 Ignoring the positivity constraints of wealth at time 2, pre-




























































Proof. As the utility function is increasing in wealth the constraint pre-
sented in equation (4) is satis¯ed in equality. Denoting by
£
B¤0;s (Ps) ;¢¤0;s (Ps)
¤
the solution of the problem described then
¢¤0;s (Ps)S0 + B
¤
0;s (Ps) ¡ qPs = y:
























¸ 0 ; i = 1;2; 3
and
qs ¸ 0:





· 0, qs ¸ 0, @E[U(:)]@qs qs = 0
leading to equation (6). The maximum is guaranteed since the second order
conditions are satis¯ed. See appendix B for details.
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In the next proposition a necessary and su±cient condition to have a
positively sloped individual supply is established.
Proposition 4 A necessary and su±cient condition for Ás (Ps) to be a pos-



























































Proof. See appendix B for details.
From the maximization problem faced by a selling agent presented above,
an individual market supply is obtained as
q = Ás (Ps) ) Ps = Á¡1s (q)
Assuming that there are n equal agents in this economy the market supply
(Q) and the inverse market supply can be written as





2.3 Arbitrage bounds, reservation prices and fair price
2.3.1 Arbitrage bounds and ¯nite utility
In order to get a ¯nite solution of the problem, we must assure that the
price of the derivative is within the superreplication bounds. In this sense,
we guarantee that there is no arbitrage opportunities in this market.





¢0Si2 + R2B0 ¸ Gi2
with i = 1; 2 and 3:
The lower bound of arbitrage-free range of variation is given by





¢0Si2 + R2B0 · Gi2
with i = 1; 2 and 3:
The upper and lower bounds can be written in a shorter way, if we
introduce some simplifying notation. Let ¼ denote the vector of parameters
of our model, ¼ ´
¡
S0;S12; S22;S32 ;G12;G22;G32; R
¢
: We further de¯ne
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H+ =
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Pu = P1;3 and P l = P2;3
if ¼ 2 G+ \ H+;
Pu = P1;3 and P l = P1;2
if ¼ 2 G+ \ H¡;
Pu = P2;3 and P l = P1;3
if ¼ 2 G¡\ H+ and
Pu = P1;2 and P l = P1;3
if ¼ 2 G¡\ H¡:
We claim that prices above P u or below P l will generate an arbitrage
opportunity and therefore, in¯nite utility. The reason is as follows. First
consider demand. If the price is below the lower bound, it would be possible
to sell a superreplicating portfolio whose current value is higher than the
derivative that is being bought. Proceeding in this way, we could assure a
positive wealth in all possible states of Nature. Selling an arbitrary number
of units of this portfolio and buying an arbitrary number of units of the
5See appendix C for the full derivation of the bounds.
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derivative would assure unbounded wealth at time t = 2: Hence, the utility
and the optimal solution would not be ¯nite. In what concerns the individual
supply, if the price is higher than the upper bound, it is possible to buy a
superreplicating portfolio that is cheaper then the derivative that is being
sold. In this way we could assure an unbounded positive wealth as well.
An interesting way of looking at this issue is to go back to the maximiza-
tion problem of both buyers and sellers of the derivative. In fact, there is no
restriction to in¯nite solutions to these problems. If we would have added
the restriction q < 1; the optimal solution would immediately imply that





Therefore, the imposition of ¯nite solutions provides an alternative way
to characterize the bounds of the no-arbitrage region.
There are two di®erent ways of proceeding, each of them leading to the
same constraints on the parameters in order to obtain a ¯nite solution of
the problem.
First, we may look at the ¯rst order conditions of the representative
investor. Alternatively, we may look at the wealth constraints.
The ¯rst argument goes like this. Ignoring that the fact that the investor









































´ A > 0
where wid is evaluated at the optimum values of ¢; qd=qs and B: Hence, the






















































































are strictly positive, we must impose some
constraints on the parameters. These constraints being satis¯ed imply that
Pu > P > P l for P u and P l de¯ned as above for the di®erent regions of ¼.
Let us now look at the wealth constraints. Each constraint on the ¯nal










if ¢0 and q are respectively the number of shares and derivatives transacted
at time t = 0: Let us now ask the following question. By how many units
may ¢0 and q change, guaranteeing an increase in the ¯nal wealth at each
state of Nature? Let d¢ and dq denote the (¯nite) variation in the number

























We can thus conclude that an increase of wealth in state i = 1; 2 and 3 occurs


























· 0 for states 1 and 3, respectively. For
state 2, however, the relevant condition depends on whether S22 ¡R2S0 > 0
or S22 ¡ R2S0 < 0.
In order to avoid an unbounded optimal solution, we must assure that









¸ 0 is satis¯ed for all i 2 f1;2;3g : As seen from our result
above, that depends on the values of ¯1; ¯2 and ¯3:
On one hand, the relation between these values of ¯s depends on how P
compares with the values of P1;2; P1;3 and P2;3; as de¯ned in equation (7),
and is given by
S22 ¡R2S0 > 0 S22 ¡ R2S0 < 0
P ¸ P2;3 ¯2 ¸ ¯3 ¯2 · ¯3
P ¸ P1;3 ¯1 ¸ ¯3 ¯1 ¸ ¯3
P · P1;2 ¯1 ¸ ¯2 ¯1 · ¯2
:
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On the other hand, the relation between P1;2; P1;3 and P2;3 depends on the
parameters ¼: The four possible situations are described in the following
Figures. They are a) ¼ 2 G+ \ H+ ) P1;2 > P2;3 > P1;3; b) ¼ 2 G+ \
H¡ ) P2;3 > P1;2 > P1;3; c) ¼ 2 G¡ \ H¡ ) P1;3 > P1;2 > P2;3; d)
¼ 2 G¡ \ H+ ) P1;3 > P2;3 > P1;2: Each set of three horizontal small
arrows, one for each state of Nature, indicates the range of values for d¢dq
such that the constraint, for each of the three states, is respected. Hence,
for the range of prices such that the regions identi¯ed by the three arrows
have a non-empty intersection, it is possible to ¯nd an unbounded optimal
























Figure 2: In the considered set of parameters ¼ 2 G+ \ H+, P must belong





















Figure 3: In the considered set of parameters ¼ 2 G+ \ H¡, P must belong
to (P12;P13) in order to avoid an unbounded solution.
Notice that, by using this procedure we end up imposing the same con-























Figure 4: In the considered set of parameters ¼ 2 G¡ \ H¡, P must belong







d 0?2? 3? 1?
dq
d 0?2? 3?1?








d 0?2? 3? 1?
dq
d 0?2? 3?1?
Figure 5: In the considered set of parameters ¼ 2 G¡ \ H+, P must belong
to (P13;P23) in order to avoid an unbounded solution.
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2.3.2 Reservation prices and the fair price
In this section we characterize the behavior of investors when the price of
the derivative is actuarially fair.6 In particular, we establish under what
conditions the investors prefer either to buy or to sell the derivative. We
also provide conditions for the investors to prefer either to buy or to sell
the underlying asset. In both cases the conditions do not depend on the
preferences. Additionally, we establish the relation between the actuarially
fair price and the reservation price of the derivative, where the reservation
price is de¯ned as the price such that the optimal transacted quantity is
zero. The results are as follows.
If both the derivative and underlying asset have actuarially fair values,
the investor transacts neither the derivative nor the risky asset. In this case
the investor prefers to assure a risk-free wealth at maturity.
Alternatively, if the price of the underlying asset is not actuarially fair,
we have two possibilities. First, if the asset is undervalued, the agent will
buy it, i.e., S0 < 1R2
P3
i=1 Si2 ) ¢¤ > 0; second, if the asset is overvalued,




2 ) ¢¤ < 0. Furthermore, in this
situation the investors buy or sell the derivative, depending on the payo®
structure, as characterized in the following lemma.




iGi2: Also, let ¹P belong to the arbitrage-free range of variation.
Then the sign of ¢¤ and q¤ are characterized in the Table below
G12 > G22 ¸ G32 G12 < G22 · G32
or or














< 0 ¢¤ < 0; q¤ > 0 ¢¤ < 0; q¤ < 0

































6We say that the price of the derivative is actuarially fair if it equals the expected
payo® at maturity discounted at the risk-free rate.
15





























Hence, in order to maximize the expected utility, the best strategy is ¢¤ =














































; which is the














Regarding the sign of the optimal q; notice that








































¢ ¡U 0 ¡w2¢¤ ;
(8)








; i = 1;2 and 3: Using the
assumption about the order of the payo®s and the fairness of P;
















0 ¡w1¢ ¡U 0 ¡w2¢]
[U 0 (w3) ¡U 0 (w2)] < 0
which implies that
w1 > w2 and w3 > w2 (Case 1)
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or
w1 < w2 and w3 < w2: (Case 2)


















We now consider the four possible situations, analyzing in each one the two
cases mentioned above.








(a) If G12 > G22 > G32; in case 1 we must have








As ¢ > 0; q must be strictly negative. The same procedure
applies if case 2 is considered, leading to









and a strictly negative value for q.
(b) G12 > G22 = G32 is incompatible with case 1. However, case 2
applies.
(c) G12 = G22 > G32 is incompatible with case 2 but case 1 applies.


















. As ¢ > 0; q must be strictly positive. A similar
reasoning applies in case 2. Using the relation in (10), ¢ > 0 )
q > 0:
(b) G12 < G22 = G32 is incompatible with case 1. However, case 2
applies.
(c) G12 = G22 < G32 is incompatible with case 2 but case 1 applies.









(a) If G12 > G22 > G32 in case 1 we must have










and ¢ < 0 ) q > 0. A similar procedure applies in case 2, where
we take









and ¢ < 0 ) q > 0.
(b) G12 > G22 = G32 is incompatible with case 1. However, case 2
applies.




2 is incompatible with case 2 but case 1 applies.

















. As ¢ < 0; q must be strictly negative. A similar









: As ¢ < 0, q must be strictly negative.




2 is incompatible with case 1. However, case 2
applies.




2 is incompatible with case 2 but case 1 applies.
We now turn to the relation between the actuarially fair price of the
derivative, ¹P; and its reservation price P̂ : The reservation price of the deriva-
tive is de¯ned as the price such that the optimal transacted quantity for a
given investor, is zero. In fact, and as opposed to the exogenous ¹P ; the
reservation price P̂ depends on the investor¶s utility.
We now present conditions that relate P̂ to ¹P .
Proposition 6 Let ¹P belong to the arbitrage-free range of variation and let
the optimal transacted quantity of the derivative decrease with price. Then,
G12 > G
2
2 ¸ G32 G12 < G22 · G32
or or
G12 ¸ G22 > G32 G12 · G22 < G32P3
i=1 p
i ¡Si2 ¡ R2S0
¢











< 0 P̂ > ¹P P̂ < ¹P
Proof. From theorem 5 we know that when P = ¹P ; the sign of the
optimal transacted quantity of the derivative is well de¯ned and does not
depend on the risk aversion of the investors. Hence, P̂ will be larger that ¹P
if the quantity demand is positive for P = ¹P and P̂ will be lower that ¹P if
the quantity demand is negative for P = ¹P:
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Remark 7 Notice that, although P̂ depends on the utility of the investors,
the fact that P̂ · ¹P or P̂ ¸ ¹P depends only on the parameters of the
economy, not on the investors' preferences.
Remark 8 Notice that, if P̂ belongs to the arbitrage-free range, ¹P must
be outside the range de¯ned by
³
inf P̂ ; sup P̂
´
; where the in¯mum and the
supremum above are taken over the class of all admissible utility functions.
2.4 Illustrations
We now consider the cases of a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA)
utility function
u (w) = ¡e¡±w





with ° > 0:
Notice that, when ° = 0, the utility function becomes u (w) = w ¡ 1,
which is a utility function characterizing a risk neutral agent. Moreover,
when ° ! 1 the utility function becomes u(w) = ln(w).
2.4.1 Explicit solution for demand and supply
For these utility functions it is possible to have an explicit solution for the















































































If a CARA utility function is considered then
½
qd = q ; q > 0





























If a CRRA utility function is considered then
½
qd = q ; q > 0
qs = ¡q ; q < 0:
where

































































2.4.2 Properties of individual demand and supply
In what follows we present some properties of the individual demand and
supply. If u(w) is a CARA utility function then7










3. The optimal number of options multiplying by ± is constant. Hence,
the demand and/or supply will shift downwards when the coe±cient
of absolute relative aversion increases, i.e.,
@qd
@±
· 0 and @qd
@±
· 0
4. The price such that the optimal number of derivatives is equal to zero
is independent of the ±:
5. The optimal number of shares is independent of the initial wealth.
If u (w) is a CARA utility function then8
7See appendix D.2.1 for details.
8See appendix D.2.7 for details.
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1. Numerically, the individual demand for the derivative can be shown




2. Numerically, the individual supply for the derivative can be shown to

























< 0: Otherwise, the reservation price is
an increasing function of °:
We perform two simulations to illustrate property 4. In the ¯rst simu-


























For the ¯rst case, the values of the parameters are described in the
following table:
S0 S12 S22 S32 G12 G22 G32 p1 p2 p3 R Y
10:5 14 10 8 4 2 0:5 0:1 0:6 0:3 1 500
Note that E [G] = 1; 75 and the arbitrage-free range of variation for the value













= ¡2: The reservation prices for a CRRA utility function are
presented in the following table
° 0; 1 3 10
P 2:1279 2:1493 2:1519 :
If a CARA utility function is presented the reservation price is independent
of ± and equals 2:1532.
For the second case the parameters are
S0 S12 S22 S32 G12 G22 G32 p1 p2 p3 R Y
10;5 15 10 8 0:5 2 4 0:1 0:6 0:3 1 500
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= 7: The reservation
prices for a CRRA utility function are as follows
° 0; 1 3 10
P 2:2133 2:1705 2:1662
If a CARA utility function is presented the reservation price equals 2:1643:
In what follows we present some simulations to obtain the individual
demand and supply. The initial value of the risky asset is S0 = 10: At
time t = 2, the risky asset can assume three di®erent values, S1;2 = 12
; S2;2 = 10:5 and S3;2 = 9: A European option with strike K = 11 and
maturity of two periods is considered. Hence, its payo®s at time two are
G1;2 = 0 ;G2;2 = 0:5 and G3;2 = 2: We consider that the rate of return
of the risk free asset is zero and a initial wealth of 500; i.e., y = 500: The
probability of occurrence of the ¯rst, second and third state of nature are,
respectively, given by 0:2, 0:3 and 0:5. Using pure arbitrage arguments we





: For each price within this range, the ¯gures below show for a CRRA
utility function with a curvature ° = 0:1; a) the demand and supply curves;
b) transacted amount of underlying asset; c) transacted amount of risk-free
asset, and d) the utility level attained for each di®erent price.8q, D, B,U<






























Figure 6: The optimum number of units of the derivative, number of shares,
amount invested in the risk free asset and the the value of the utility for
di®erent values of the price of the derivative are presented.
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Figure 7: Individual demand and supply of the derivative in the same graph.
For prices above 1:18 the agent is selling the derivative. However, if the price
is below that threshold the agent is buying the derivative.
This last ¯gure is obtained by inverting the ¯rst graph above and illus-
trates the individual demand and supply of the derivative. For prices above
1:18 the agent is selling (q < 0) the derivative. However, if the price is below
that threshold, the agent is buying the derivative (q < 0). Finally, a CARA
utility function would present the same basic features of the curves above.
3 Market-Makers
In the previous section we presented the optimization problem of illiquid
traders and derive the demand and supply of derivatives as a function of
exogenous endowments. In this section we present the problem faced by
market-makers, given the demand and supply functions for derivatives. In
fact, the optimal strategy of a ¯nancial institution transacting such contracts
depends on wether there are competitors or not. First, we are going to
consider a monopolistic market-maker, Then, we allow competition between
market-makers9. Given optimal prices and quantities the market-maker(s)
must also choose an hedging strategy, constituted of stocks and bonds.
9One important features of exchanges trading options is the use of specialits by the
American Stock Exchange in place of competing market-makers on the Chicago Board
Options Exchange. The option specialist has access to a greater amount of information
than other traders and, therefore, can mantain a monopolistic position. For instance,
on many exchanges, only the specialist has information about the orders at the opening
of the market. The access to this information allows him to extract some monopolistic
pro¯ts. In contrast, at the CBOE each market-maker is required to compete with others
market-makers. CBOE requires that each transaction be executed at the highest bid and
lowest ask prices emerging from the group of market-makers participating in the process.
23
3.1 Monopolistic Market-Maker
The monopolist market-maker's problem consists of choosing the bid and
ask prices, together with a hedging strategy, so as to maximize his or her
expected utility. Equivalently, the problem can also be solved choosing the
optimal quantities to transact (sell and buy) and the optimal hedging strate-
gies. This equivalence follows from the assumption that the monopolistic
market-maker must satisfy all market demand and supply at the ask and
bid prices that he sets. Let QA(QB) be the number of European derivatives
that the market-maker is selling (buying), ¢ be the number of shares and
B be the amount invested in the risk-free asset. In what follows we allow
the optimal quantity sold (QA) by the market-maker to be di®erent from
the optimal quantity bought (QB).








QBGi2 ¡ QAGi2 + ¢Si2 + R2B
¤
subject to
¢S0 + B ¡QAPd (QA) + QBPs (QB) · y (12)
QBGi2 ¡QAGi2 +¢Si2 + R2B ¸ 0 ; i = 1;2; 3 and (13)
QB ¸ 0; QA ¸ 0 (14)
Several assumptions concerning the market demand and supplyare made.
Assumption 1: The supply and the demand functions are, respectively,














Gi2 ¡ R2Ps (QB)
¢ ¡ QA
¡








is concave in QA; QB and ¢10.
These rules induce a strong competition between market-makers.
10See appendix C.4 for details on this assumption.This function is simply the objective
function of the monopolist, incorporating the r̄st restriction, shown later to be always
binding.
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Just for notation let ¹Xk2 ´ Xk2=R2: Also, let the sets K and Bk (QA; QB; ¢;B)



















(QA;QB; ¢;B) : ¢S0 +B + QAPd (QA) ¡QBPs (QB) = y;
QBGi2 ¡ QAGi2 + ¢Si2 +R2B ¸ 0; i 6= k and












the function of Q11
©k (Q) =
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ d[QP (Q)]dQ









The existence of the bid-ask spread is characterized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 9 (Equilibrium Condition) Under assumptions 1 and 2, and
in the presence of a risk-neutral monopolist market-maker, a su±cient con-
dition for the existence of an equilibrium with strictly positive quantities
fQ¤B;Q¤Ag ; is characterized by Q¤A and Q¤B satisfying either
©k (Q¤B) = ©






















2 ¡ª(Q¤A) ¡ ¸k








i=1 pi ¹Si2 ¡ S0 ¡ ¸k








11Note that, if we consider the market supply, ©k is evaluated at Q = QB. Alternatively,
if we consider the market demand, ©k is evaluated at Q =QA:
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¤;B¤) 2 Bk (QA;QB; ¢;B) \ Bj (QA;QB;¢; B) : Moreover, we
can assure that the above conditions are also su±cient to generate a bid-ask
spread, i.e., Pd (Q¤A) > Ps (Q¤B) :
Proof. Taking into account that, at the optimum, ¢S0 +B +QAPd ¡









£ ¹Gi2 ¡ Ps (QB)
¤
¡ QA









£ ¹Gi2 ¡Ps (QB)
¤
+QA





¡ y · 0
for i = 1; 2 and 3 and
QB ¸ 0; QA ¸ 0:
Since the objective function is quasiconcave and the constraint set is con-
vex12, we can assure13 the existence of a solution for the problem. Moreover,
we can assure14 that the solution of the problem is given by the Kuhn-Tucker
solutions, provided that all the constraints that hold in equality are inde-
pendent.







£ ¹Gi2 ¡Ps (QB)
¤ ¡QA













£ ¹Gi2 ¡Ps (QB)
¤
¡QA





















d¸i · 0 ¸i · 0
dL
ḑ i i̧ = 0
12See appendix C.4.
13See theorem MK4, in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), page 962.
14and once again using a theorem of Mas-Colell et al. (1995), theorem MK2, page 959,
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for i = 1; 2 and 3: If the solution is characterized by Q¤A > 0 and Q
¤
B > 0,





































Notice that it is not possible to have all i̧ < 0; i = 1;2; 3 at the optimal
point characterizing the solution. If i̧ < 0; i = 1;2;3, all constraints would
be binding and the value of the objective function would be zero. Moreover,






Hence, either there is only one value of i such that i̧ = 0; or there is only
one value of i such that i̧ < 0. In the latter case, the ¯rst order conditions
presented above result in equation (15) with ¸k = ¾k < 0 ) k 2 K: In the
former case, the ¯rst order conditions lead to equation (16).
The result of existence of a bid-ask spread under the above conditions is
discussed in appendix E.
In what follows, we present a necessary and su±cient condition in order
to have equation (15) ful¯lled. Notice that
©k (QB = 0) =
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ P̂s
¹Gk2 ¡ P̂s
and ©k (QA = 0) =
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ P̂d
¹Gk2 ¡ P̂d
where P̂s and P̂d are the supply and demand reservation prices, respectively.
Corollary 10 A necessary and su±cient condition to have equation (15)
satis¯ed is that there are reservation prices P̂d and P̂s such that





2 ¡ ¹Gk2 · 0; and





2 ¡ ¹Gk2 ¸ 0: Moreover, necessary conditions to have equations
(Case I) and (Case II) satis¯ed are
3X
i=1
pi ¹Gi2 < P̂d · P̂s < ¹Gk2: (Case I)
3X
i=1
pi ¹Gi2 > P̂d ¸ P̂s > ¹Gk2: (Case II)
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is well de¯ned by assumption 2.
Therefore, we identify the regions where ©k (QB) is decreasing in QB; and








2 ¡ ¹Gk2 · 0
d©k(QB)
dQB ¸ 0 · 0
d©k(QA)
dQA · 0 ¸ 0
Equation (15) reads ©k (Q¤A) = ©
k (Q¤B) = ¾
k: Now consider the caseP3
i=1 pi ¹G
i
2 ¡ ¹Gk2 ¸ 0: In that region ©k (Q¤A) = ©k (Q¤B) ) ©k (QA = 0) ¸
©k (QB = 0) ; and the full equation (15) is satis̄ ed i®
©k (QA = 0) ¸ ¾k ¸ ©k (QB = 0) :
As ©k (Q = 0) is an increasing function on P; then P̂d ¸ P̂s:
In what follows we present the relation between P̂d; P̂s;
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 and
¹Gk2 at the optimum of the monopolistic market-maker.
Suppose that P̂d and P̂s belong to the arbitrage-free range of variation
for the value of a European derivative. It is not possible to have both
P̂d and P̂s above
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 or below ¹Gk2; otherwise ©k (QA = 0) > 0 and
©k (QB = 0) > 0; which is incompatible with ¾k < 0: Moreover, it is not

















: Finally, the situation
where P̂s < ¹Gk2 is also not possible because in that case ©k (QB = 0) > 0;




pi ¹Gi2 > P̂d ¸ P̂s > ¹Gk2:








pi ¹Gi2 < P̂s · P̂d < ¹Gk2:
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There are two important remarks regarding the equilibrium condition
above. First, in order to have an equilibrium bid-ask spread, we must as-
sure that P̂d > P̂s: Hence, the risk aversion characterizing each represen-
tative agent of the demand side has to be di®erent from the risk aversion
characterizing each representative agent of the supply side; second, in equi-
librium the market-maker gains in one side of the market but loses in the
other side of the market.
We illustrate the second point as follows. Consider case II presented
above. In equilibrium, the market-maker gains, in terms of expected pro¯t,










The interpretation of this equilibrium results from the fact that (i) in equi-
librium, at least one of the wealth constraints is binding and (ii) the interval
de¯ned by the the demand and supply reservation prices does not contain




2. The intuition is
as follows. The latter fact implies that a market-maker in both sides of the
market (selling and buying the derivative) has necesarily positive utility on
one side, and negative expected utility on the other side. A market-maker
may thus choose to be only on the side of the market that provides a pos-
itive expected utility. However, in order to maximize the expected utility,
the market-maker may ¯nd an incentive to enter on the other side of the
market, just to relax the binding restrictions. This would happen only if
the resulting negative expected utility would be more than compensated by
the improvement of the positive expected utility on the other side of the
market. Our result re°ects the fact that a bid-ask spread exists only when
the market-maker faces one such incentive.
3.2 Competition Between Market-Makers
In this section, our model is extended to consider the presence of several
market-makers. In an oligopoly, the payo®s for one market-maker depends
on its own actions, as well as on the actions of the other market-makers.
The strategic interactions between the market-makers will determine the
equilibrium.
Here, individual market-makers simultaneously determine their bid and
ask prices, the number of shares and the amount invested in the risk-free
asset, behaving in their own interest in an noncooperative game. The objec-
tive is to compute the Nash equilibrium of this game. A Nash equilibrium
in prices is a vector of prices such that each market-maker maximizes its
expected payo®s given the other market-maker¶s decisions.
Let M be the number of market-makers in this market. Market-maker
i; i = 1; :::;M; has expected utility Ui (Pi;d;Pi;s; P¡i;d; P¡i;s;¢i;¢¡i) ; where
Pi;d, Pi;s and ¢i are, respectively, the ask price, the bid price and the num-
ber of units of the underlying asset hold by market-maker i: The values
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P¡i;d;P¡i;s and ¢¡i correspond to the components of the vector of the
analogous variables relative to the remaining M ¡ 1 market-makers, i.e.,
(P¡i;d; P¡i;s;¢¡i) = (Pj;d;Pj;s; ¢j)j2f1;:::;Mg;j 6=i :
Formally, the expected utility of market-maker j corresponds to its ex-
pected pro¯t, given by




















For given prices, the optimal amount transacted solve the problem
Ui (Pj;d; Pj;s;P¡j;d; P¡j;s) = max
¢j
¦j (Pj;d; Pj;s;P¡j;d;P¡j;s;¢j ; ¢¡j)
leading to an optimal amount ¢¤j = ¢j (Pj;d; Pj;s;P¡j;d;P¡j;s) and charac-
terizing the expected utility function to be maximized on prices. In fact, for
that given amount ¢¤j , prices are set optimally as the solution of
max
Pj;s;Pj;d
Ui (Pj;d; Pj;s;P¡j;d; P¡j;s)
subject to














for i = 1;2;3; and where Qj;B (Pj;s; P¡j;s) and Qj;A (Pj;d;P¡j;d) are, respec-
tively, the demand and supply functions faced by ¯rm j:
Financial products are generally accepted as being homogeneous goods15.
As a consequence, options traded be di®erent intermediaries are perfect sub-
stitutes in the investor's utility function, and investors will transact with the
intermediary setting the best price. The point is that in ¯nancial markets the
best quotes can be easily found. In particular, automated trading systems
facilitate the disclosure of the best price. Hence, the homogeneous good as-
sumption gives rise to discontinuity of the demand and supply curves. Typi-
cally, market-maker j is viewed as facing the demand curve Qj;A (Pj;d;P¡j;d),
which is a function of the ask-price that all market-makers quote. Supposing
that Pi;d = Pk;d; for all i; k 6= j,




ÂA (Pj;d;Pi;d) ; if Pj;d > Pi;d; for all i
1
MQA (Pj;d) ; if Pj;d = Pi;d; for all i
QA (Pj;d) ; if Pj;d < Pi;d; for all i:
; (17)
15There are, however, some exceptions to this view. Menyah and Paudyal (2000) argue
that the \order °ow on the LSE like Nasdaq does not necessarily go to the dealer with
the most competitive quotes because of preferencing and internalisation by brokers". In
such a case, orders may be satis¯ed by market-makers not posting the best quoted prices.
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where Â (Pj;d;Pi;d) 2
£
0;QA (Pj;d)¡ M¡1M QA (Pi;d)
¤
:
The last line re°ects the fact that, if market-maker j quotes a lower price
than the competitors, he will face all the market demand. The second line is
trivially equivalent to a fair ratio among the market-makers. The ¯rst line,
however, is more subtle. If market-maker j quotes a higher price than his
competitors, several situations are possible. As the competitors of market-
maker j have wealth constraints, it may happen that they are not able to
sell additional units at the lower price to former customers of market-maker
j. In that case Qj;A (Pj;d;P¡j;d) = QA (Pj;d) ¡ M¡1M QA (Pi;d) : However, it
also may be possible that, even having binding constraints16, competitors
are able to sell additional units to former customers of market-maker j: In
this case, the demand faced by market-maker j when he quotes a higher
price will be zero, i.e., Qj;A (Pj;d; P¡j;d) = 0: An intermediary solution is
also possible, where the competitors are not able to sell for all the former
customers of market-maker j. Hence, we can conclude that when market-
maker j sets a price above his competitors, his demand will belong to the
range
£
0;QA (Pj;d) ¡ M¡1M QA (Pi;d)
¤
: Figure 8 illustrates this discontinuity







Figure 8: The market demand and the demand faced by market-maker j;
for the case where the wealth restrictions of the competitors do not allow to
sell the derivative to any of his former customers.
On the other hand, market-maker j is viewed as facing the following
16This is the case if
P3
i=1 p








QB (Pj;s) ; if Pj;s > Pi;s; for all i
1
MQB (Pj;s) ; if Pj;s = Pi;s; for all i
ÂB (Pj;s; Pi;s) ; if Pj;s < Pi;s; for all i:
(18)
where ÂB (Pj;s; Pi;s) 2
£
0; QB (Pj;s) ¡ M¡1M QB (P¡j;s)
¤









Figure 9: The market supply and the supply faced by market-maker j; for
the case where the wealth restrictions of the competitors do not allow to
buy the derivative to any of his former suppliers.
De¯nition 11 A vector of ask and bid prices (P¤d ; P
¤


















¸ Ui (Pi;d; Pi;s;P¡i;d;P¡i;s) :
In other words, a set of prices is a Nash equilibrium if market-makers
have no incentive to set di®erent prices to obtain higher utility.
The equilibrium result known as Bertrand Paradox establishes that price
competition between two or more identical ¯rms with no constraints leads
to price equal to marginal cost, and ¯rms make no pro¯t. As market-makers
are perfect competitors in prices, it is usual in the literature to accept that
market-makers earn zero pro¯ts. However, that is not the case here, since
there are positive wealth constraints. Hence, we must investigate further
the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium of this game.
For each ¯rm j we de¯ne two reaction functions as the optimal prices
(demand and supply) as a function of the prices quoted by other ¯rms,
P ¤j;s = ¨j;s (P¡j;s;Pj;d;P¡j;d) ;
P¤j;d = ¨j;d (P¡j;d;Pj;s; P¡j;s) :
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; 8j 2 f1; : : : ;Mg
:
Theorem 12 Under the assumptions of the model, if all market-makers are
risk-neutral, there is no pure symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof. Let (P¤d ;P
¤
s ) be an equilibrium' candidate. We prove that there
is always a pro¯table deviation and therefore (P¤d ; P
¤
s ) cannot be an equi-
librium. The proof examines the case of zero, one, two or all binding con-
straints.






> 0(< 0) each market-maker could increase the
expected pro¯t by increasing (decreasing) ¢: Therefore, in order to elimi-
nate all the deviations concerning ¢ we must analyze the cases with one,
two or three binding constraints.
A solution with three binding constraints would not be an equilibrium of
the game. In that case, the expected pro¯t would be zero and a pro¯table
deviation would be, for instance, Pd = P̂d, Ps = P̂s and ¢ = 0; with an
expected pro¯t of R2y:
Now let us turn to the more complex case of one binding constraint (say,





> 0 the constraint that is
binding is the one such that ¹Sk2 ¡S0 < 0; because if that is not the case that
would be possible to increase utility increasing ¢: On the other hand; for





< 0 the constraint that is binding is
the one such that ¹Sk2 ¡ S0 > 0:
In order to check for all the pro¯table deviations for market-maker j as-
sume that all other market-makers are playing the hypothetical equilibrium.
If market-maker j decides to slightly increase the price that he is charging
to the demand (Pj;d); and if the wealth constraints of his competitors do

















However, if the market-maker j decides to decrease Pj;d , he will face all the









where dQj;A denotes the variation in the quantity sold by ¯rm j: Note that,
and ignoring the positivity constraints of wealth at time T = 2; in order
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to be pro¯table to slightly increase the price, we must assure that equation
(19) is positive. Moreover, it would be pro¯table to slightly decrease the
price, increasing the quantity sold, if equation (20) is positive.
Additionally, we must take care of the wealth constraints. As already
mentioned, because the expected pro¯t and the wealth constraints are lin-
ear in the quantity of stocks bought/sold (¢); at least one of the wealth
constraints is binding. Let this constraint be denoted by k: In an analogous
way to the case just described of the expected pro¯t, if the market-maker
decides to slightly increase the price that he is charging to the demand (Pj;d)















However, if the market-maker j decides to slightly decrease Pj;d, he will face









where dQj;A denotes the variation in the quantity sold by ¯rm j, as before.
All the possibilities concerning the sign of equations (19), (20), (21) and
(22) are presented in the next table.
Eq. (19) Eq. (20) Eq. (21) Eq. (22)
Case I · 0 > 0 · 0 > 0
Case II · 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Case III · 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
Case IV · 0 > 0 > 0 = 0
Case V > 0 ¸ 0 > 0 ¸ 0
Case VI > 0 ¸ 0 > 0 · 0
Case VII > 0 > 0 · 0 > 0
Case VIII > 0 = 0 · 0 > 0
Case IX > 0 · 0 > 0 ¸ 0
Case X > 0 · 0 > 0 · 0
Case XI > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
Case XII > 0 < 0 = 0 > 0
If cases I and II were considered the market-maker j could slightly de-
crease the price that he is charging, increasing the quantity that he is selling,
which would result in an increase of the expected value of the wealth. In
case III the market-maker can ¯nd a pro¯table deviation by changing Pj;d
and ¢j. See appendix F. In case IV, if market-maker j decides to increase
the price the quantity demand will be zero. The reason is that as equa-
tion (20) and equation (22) are nonnegative the other market-makers can
increase their expected wealth by selling to the investors that used to buy
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from market-maker j: Hence, we can not ¯nd a pro¯table deviation changing
Pj;d: In what follows we will ¯nd a pro¯table equilibrium changing Pj;s: We
begin by noticing that, as
P3
i=1pi ¹Gi2 does not belong to the interval de¯ned
by the reservation price, then
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 does not belong to the interval
de¯ned P¡j;s and P¡j;d; with P¡j;d > P¡j;d: Hence, the situation described
in this case,
P3
i=1pi ¹Gi2 < P¡j;d = ¹Gk2; implies
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 < P¡j;s · ¹Gk2:









































If the impact on the constraint is positive a pro¯table deviation for market-
maker j is slightly decrease the price Pj;s: However, if that is not the case it
is possible to ¯nd a pro¯table deviation changing Pj;s and ¢j: See appendix
F.
Case V is analogous to case IV. In what concerns cases VI, IX and X,
the market-maker j must increase the price that he is charging, decreasing
the quantity that he is selling and increase the expected value of the wealth.
Case VII is equal to case I and II. Case VIII is not an admissible possibil-
ity because by equation (19) and (21) we conclude that
P3
i=1 p
i ¹Gi2 > ¹Gk2,
whether by equations (20) and (22) we conclude
P3
i=1 p
i ¹Gi2 < ¹Gk2; that is a
contradiction. The remaining cases are presented in the appendix.
Another possibility is that there is two constraints binding. Let them be
denoted by m and n: In appendix F, all the possibilities concerning the re-
lation between Pd; Ps, ¹Gn2 and ¹G
m
2 ; are presented in Figure 10. Futhermore,
a pro¯table deviation for each case is identi¯ed.
Hence, if price competition between market-makers is introduced in our
model, there would not exist a pure and symmetric Nash Equilibrium of the
game.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a simple economy where markets are in-
complete due to the inexistence of transactions of the underlying at some
points in time.
Although our two-period economy may be seen as simple, our main con-
tributions are quite robust since they do not depend on the type of utility
functions considered. They may be summarized as follows.
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First, we have characterized the investment decisions in the risky assets,
when the derivative is fairly priced.
Second, we ¯nd that if the fair price is in the no-arbitrage region, then it
is either above the reservation ask price or below the reservation bid price.
The implication is that, for a risk-neutral, monopolistic market-maker to
transact in both sides of the market, a loss in one side is necessary to justify
the gain in the other side.
Third, su±cient conditions for an equilibrium to exist under a risk-
neutral, monopolistic market-maker are presented.
Finally and interestingly, the imperfection considered here (dry markets)
su±ces to provide conditions assuring the existence of a bid-ask spread under
a monopolistic market-maker, although one such equilibrium can be shown
not to exist when competition in prices is introduced.
Furthermore, for some speci¯c and standard utility functions we can
show several additional results.
First, demand and supply curves have the desired behaviour.
Second, the reservation prices do not depend on the agents' initial wealth
level.
Third, the reservation prices may depend on the agents' risk aversion. In
the case of a CARA utility function the reservation price does not depend on
the absolute risk aversion coe±cient. However, in the case of a CRRA utility
function, the reservation price does depend on the relative risk aversion
coe±cient.
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A Some Proofs on the Demand
Individual Demand: Second Order Conditions
In this appendix we present the second order conditions of the problem
presented in section 2.1 and show that, using the concavity of the utility











































































































¸ 0 the second order conditions are always satis¯ed.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let F (qd; ¢;Pd) and G (qd; ¢;Pd) denote the ¯rst order conditions, for a
positive qd; of the problem that must be solved to ¯nd the market demand,
i.e.,
















































































































































































the sign of dqddPd depends on the sign of the numerator.
B Some Proofs on the Supply
Individual Supply: Second Order Conditions
In this appendix we present the second order conditions of the problem
presented in section 2.2 and show that, using the concavity of the utility


















Using the same procedure as in appendix (A) we can conclude that the
second order conditions are always satis¯ed.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Let F (qs;¢; Ps) and G (qs; ¢;Ps) denote the ¯rst order conditions, for a
positive qs; of the problem that must be solved to ¯nd the market demand,
i.e.,












































































































































where SOC¢;qss is the second order condition. As SOC¢;qss is always
positive the sign of @q@P depends on the sign of the numerator.
C Arbitrage bounds





¢0Si2 + R2B0 ¸ Gi2
with i = 1; 2 and 3:
In the optimum two of the wealth constraints will be binding. Remember
that, by assumption, S12 > S22 > S32: Three possibilities must be considered.
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1. The constraints binding are the ¯rst and the second. In that case the






































2. The constraints binding are the ¯rst and the third. In that case the







































3. The constraints binding are the second and the third. In that case the




































































there are two possible solutions. The solution described in situation 1 has a
























































































¼ : S22 ¡R2S0 · 0
ª









































if ¼ 2 G¡\ H¡:
The lower bound is given by




¢0Si2 + R2B0 · Gi2
with i = 1; 2 and 3:









































if ¼ 2 G+ \ H¡:
D Illustrations
D.1 Explicit Solution for the individual demand and supply
functions
A solution for the demand and supply of the derivative for a CARA and
a CRRA utility functions can be explicitly obtained. The procedure is the
following:
Ignoring that the fact that the investor is buying or selling the derivative,








































´ A > 0
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where wi is evaluated at the optimum values of ¢; qd=qs and B: Hence, the

































































































































































































¡ [U0 (A¹3)]¡1 = ¡R2y
(23)
The system presented above is a system of three equations and three vari-
ables (q;¢0; A), with a unique solution for the CARA and CRRA utility
functions. First, we are going to consider the CARA utility functions and
then the CRRA utility functions.

















































































































































































































D.2 Properties of the individual demand and supply
D.2.1 CARA utlity functions
D.2.2 Property 1

















































































For a CARA utility function the ¯rst order conditions presented in equations


























































































































In order to prove that dÁd(Pd)d± · 0 notice that the ¯rst and second conditions
of the optimization problem can be written in terms of ¤ = ±¢ and ¡ = ±q;
eliminating ± and q from the ¯rst and second order conditions. Hence, we
can only ¯nd the optimal values of ¤ and ¡ (¤¤ and ¡¤). The optimal values
of the number of shares bought/sold and the number of options bought/sold
is given by
¢ = ¤¤±
q = ¡¤± :
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D.2.5 Property 4
This property follows from the fact that ±q is constant.
D.2.6 Property 5
Moreover, note that the ¯rst and second conditions are independent of y:
Hence, the optimal values will also be independent of y:
D.2.7 CRRA utility functions
For a CRRA utility function the ¯rst order conditions presented in equations































For a CRRA utility function the ¯rst order conditions presented in equa-





























D.2.8 Property 1 and 2
See Section 2.4.
D.2.9 Property 3
The property is straightforward using the optimal quantity de¯ned in equa-
tion (11).
D.2.10 Property 4
Let the function À (P; °) be de¯ned as17


















17Note that each ¹i is a function of P.
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Using the optimal quantity, de¯ned in equation (11), the reservation price





































































As the denominator of the second fraction is always positive we have to
check the sign of the numerator in order to de¯ne the sign of dP̂d° :
Using equation (24) we can write ¹
¡ 1°





































3 , ¹1 > ¹2 > ¹3 , ¹1 > 1;¹3 < 1: (case B)
Additionally, as ln(:) is a concave function we have






































































































< 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0






































































E Monopolistic Market Maker
Conditions on Assumption 2
A function f : A ! R is concave if and only if for every x 2 A; the
Hessian matrix D2f (x) is negative semide¯nite. For the function considered,
the Hessian matrix is
2
664








Hence, this matrix negative semide¯nite if and only if QBPs (QB) is a convex



















Proof of theorem 9
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E.0.11 Convexity of the constraint set
In order to check for the convexity of the constraint set consider two possible


























































3¢ = ¡¸Q1B +(1 ¡¸)Q2B;¸Q1A +(1 ¡ ¸)Q2A; ¸¢1 +(1 ¡ ¸) ¢2
¢
respects the three constraints then the constraint set is convex. In order to
check for that characteristic of the constraint set, multiply equation (25) by


























































































¡ R2y · 0:
E.0.12 Existence of the Bid-Ask Spread
In what follows the proof of the second part of theorem 9, that concerns the
existence of a bid-ask spread if there is an equilibrium with strictly positive
quantities fQ¤B;Q¤Ag ; is presented.
First, consider the optimal condition expressed in equality (15) is con-
sidered. Then, the optimal condition expressed in equality (16) is also con-
sidered.
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In the case pesented in equations (15) the proof is done by contradic-
tion. Suppose that Pd (Q¤A) · Ps (Q¤B) : Consider equation (16). Three cases






Ps (Q¤B) ; Q¤B
dPs(Q¤B)
dQB




Using equation (15), we obtain
¹Gk2 ¡Pd (Q¤B) ¡ Q¤A
dPd (Q¤A)
dQA































Ps (Q¤B) ¡ Pd (Q¤A) < 0;
contradicting Pd (Q¤A) · Ps (Q¤B) :











































Pd (Q¤A) ¡ Ps (Q¤B) > 0;
contradicting Pd (Q¤A) · Ps (Q¤B) :





: In this case, from
equation(15) we obtain the same relation that is displayed in equation (27),
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for the case Pd (Q¤A) < ¹G
k
2 < Ps (Q
¤
B) : Therefore, by contraction we prove
that for the tangency solution Pd (Q¤A) > Ps (Q
¤
B) :
Now, consider the optimal conditions expressed in equations (16). Sub-
tracting the second equation from the ¯rst one we have
(1 ¡ ¸k ¡ j̧) [ª (Q¤A) ¡ ª(Q¤B)] = 0:
As 1 ¡ ¸k ¡ ¸j > 0; we must assure ª (Q¤A) ¡ ª(Q¤B) = 0: Then, using
assumption 1, and noting that ª (Q¤A) ¡ ª(Q¤B) = 0 is equivalent to






we have Pd (Q¤A)¡ Ps (Q¤B) > 0:
F Competition Between Market-Makers
Proof of theorem (12)
Proof. Case III










































Deviation: Increase Pj;d and decrease ¢0 if ¹Sk2 ¡ S0 > 0 or increase ¢0















































i ¹Gi2 ¡ Pj;d
























































Deviation: Decrease Pj;d! increase Q¤j;A and increase ¢0 if ¹Sk2 ¡S0 > 0 or
decrease ¢0 if ¹Sk2 ¡ S0 < 0
Case IV













































pi ¹Gi2 ¡ Pj;s · 0 and ¹Gk2 ¡ Pj;s ¸ 0
Proceeding in an analogous way as in case III we can ¯nd a pro¯table devi-
ation changing Pj;s and ¢j .
Case XI











































Deviation: Increase P ¤j;d and increase ¢0 if ¹S
k
2 ¡ S0 > 0 or decrease ¢0 if






























































pi ¹Gi2 ¡ P¤j;d > 0

















































i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ Pj;d
i
¡dQj;A















we have the following deviation
Deviation: Decrease Pj;d! increase Q¤j;A and decrease ¢0 if ¹Sk2 ¡S0 > 0
or increase ¢0 if ¹Sk2 ¡ S0 < 0:
Case XII
















Now, consider the case when two constraints are binding. Let them be
constraint m and n: All the possibilities concerning the relation between Pd;
Ps, ¹Gn2 and ¹Gm2 ; are presented in Figure 10.
If an agent decides to increase Ps or decrease Pd, the positive alteration
in quantities must be such that
dQj;B
¡ ¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
¢
¡ dQj;A




¡ ¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
¢
¡ dQj;A
¡ ¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¢
¸ 0









pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
´
> 0
















8Qj;B;8Qj;A ; Pj;s <
P3
i=1 p


















































Figure 10: The possibilities concerning the relation between Pd; Ps, ¹Gn2 and
¹Gm2 :
The constraints will be respected if
dQj;B
³























Now, for each case presented in Figure 10 a pro¯table deviation will be
presented.
Case I




½ ¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")







¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")P3







½ ¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")




½ ¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")








i ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹G
i
2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
which is veri¯ed.
Case II




¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
:
Situation A:





i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")P3






i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")







¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
:
Situation C:





i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹G
i




i ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹G
i
2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
>
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
any dQj;BdQj;A such that
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")






i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")P3




In order to have the wealth constraints respected we must have
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")





¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
:
It is easy to check that there is a non-empty set for dQj;BdQj;A :
Situation A:






i ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
.Hence, as
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
<
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
any dQj;BdQj;A such that
max
(
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")P3






¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
Situation B:
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")





¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
:
Situation C:





i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")P3




i ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹G
i
2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
>
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
any dQj;BdQj;A such that
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")






¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")




i ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹G
i





Any possible dQj;BdQj;A will respect the wealth constraints. Hence, it is pos-
sible to ¯nd a deviation that increases utility.
Case V




¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
:
Situation A:






i ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹G
i




i ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
<
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
any dQj;BdQj;A such that
P3
i=1p
i ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3





¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")





¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
:
Situation C:





i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
)
Case VI




½ ¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
¾
Situation A:





i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")P3




i=1 pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
< min
½ ¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")




i=1pi ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3





½ ¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")






½ ¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d¡ ")







¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")
¹Gn2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
;
¹Gm2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")




i ¹Gi2 ¡ (Pj;d ¡ ")P3
i=1pi ¹G
i
2 ¡ (Pj;s + ")
)
which is veri¯ed.
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